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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LARRY SHELMIDINE, et. al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
CHARLENE POLLY COOK,
Intervener,

Case No. 14152

-vsCHARLES A. JONES, et. al.,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

THE INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
The Utah Civil Liberties Union is a branch of the
American Civil Liberties Union, an organization dedicated
to the preservation of individual liberty under law.
Your amicus has entered this case in order to urge to the
Court its view on the important constitutional issues
raised by this case.
STATEMENT
The amicus accepts the Statement of the Nature of the
Case, Disposition in the Lower Court, Relief Sought on
Appeal and Cross Appeal, and Statement of Facts contained
in the other briefs in this case.

In the interest of

brevity, those statements will not be restated here.
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-laAmi cus curiae urges that the Court affirm the decision
below.

"That the practise . . . which allows nonlawyer or

lay justices of the peace to impose a jail sentence or imprisonment constitutes a denial of a criminal defendant's right to a
fair trial. . ." Affirmance of that ruling would leave open
the issue of the constitutionality of trial before lay justices
of the peace in cases involving only fines of less than three
hundred dollars. Affirmance of the decision below would thus
have minimal impact on the Utah judicial system and leave
to future decision any questions about the constitutionality
of trial before a justice of the peace in matters involving
fines alone.

Such a distinction is supportible in principle

given the significance to anyone of even a short deprivation
of liberty and the priority of liberty as a value to be
protected under our system of justice.
Our contention in this case is founded on guarantees of
due process contained in both the State and Federal Constitutions;
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 7, United States Constitution,
Fourteenth Amendment.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIRES THAT A JUDGE IN A
CRIMINAL CASE IN WHICH A JAIL SENTENCE MAY BE
IMPOSED BE TRAINED IN THE LAW,
When in 1215 at Runymede, King_ John was forced by his
barons to sign the Magna Carta, he swore to two propositions
relevant to this case:
No free man shall be taken, imprisoned,
disseased . . . or in any way destroyed,
nor will we proceed against or prosecute
him, except by the lawful judgment of his
peers and by the law of the land. Chapter
39.
We will appoint as justiciaries, constables,
sheriffs- or bailiffs only such men as knox^
the law of the land and will keep it well.
Chapter 45. 1
Magna Carta has often been called the foundation of our
liberty and the cornerstone of our law.

These characteriza-

tions are true, not because the specific rules and standards
apply to modern time -- though some like those above still
do --" but because Magna Carta represents a principle, that
the sovereign is itself subject to law, that citizens have
rights which government must recognize though on occasion
it be inconvenient to do so. When King John promised his
subjects due process of law and the appointment of judges
who knew the law, he was promising that as sovereign he
would follow procedures which were just and lawful in
applying the law of the land.

Today, the rights of citizens

to justice pursuant to law, transcend convenience, transcend
even the comfort and inertia of established practice when
A. E. Dick Howard, Magna Carta. Text and Commentary 43,
45 (1964).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-3it can be shown that established practice has, by reason of
changing times and changing •ircumstances become inconsistent
with the due process of law.

Your amicus submits this brief to .

urge that, in 1975 constitutional guarantees of due process
derived in part from the Magna Carta include the right to be
tried by a judge trained in the law, and capable, as today only
a law trained person can be, of knowing the law and applying
it competently.
The concept of due process is not a static and fixed concept.

If Magna Carta remained but a feudal compact, it would

be meaningless today.

Due process has grown and changed with

the time truly reflecting in the words of Justice Powell in
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 467, (1972) that :
Due process, as consistently interpreted . . .
commands that citizens subjected to criminal
process in state courts be accorded those
rights that are fundamental to a fair trial in
the context of our American scheme of justice.
In State v. Phillips, No. 13816,Sept.15, 1975, Justice Ellett
concurring, quotes Daniel Webster's classic explanation of
due process, nlaw of the land", in the Dartmouth College
case, 4 Wheat. 518, 581, as follows:
[A] law, which hears before it condemns;
which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial.
This Court recognized over 80 years ago that constitutional standards derived from the common law changed and
developed with the development of our society.

In Hess v.

White, 9 Utah 61 (1893) this Court interpreting the right
to jury trial held unanimous verdict was not required in
civil cases.

The Court said, per curiam,a t page 68, quoting from

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-4-Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516:
The Constitution of the United States
was ordained, it is true by descendants
of Englishmen who inherited the traditions of English law and history; but it
was made for an undefined and expanding
future and for a people gathered and to
be gathered from many nations and of many
tongues . . . There is nothing in Magna
Carta, rightly construed as a broad
charter of public right and law, which
ought to exclude the best ideas of all
systems and of every age; and as it was
the characteristic principle of the common
law to draw its inspiration from every
fountain of justice, we are not to assume
that the sources of its supply have been
exhausted. On the contrary, we should
expect that the new and varied experiences
of our own situation and system will mold
and shape it into new and not less useful
forms.
While the Court in Hess v. White was speaking to the claim
that the Constitution barred a modern change not known at
common law, less than unanimous verdicts in civil cases,
what it said applies equally to a practice known at common
law no longer consistent in modern society with basic
standards of right and justice.
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,(1932),Justice Sutherland
for a unanimous court recognized that a right to counsel in
a capital case was part of due process of law guaranteed to
state citizens by the federal Constitution.

Justice

Sutherland so ruled though, as he recognized, the right to
counsel in felony cases was not recognized by the common
law of England and seems not to have been unanimously
recognized by the thirteen colonies before the Declaration

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-5of Independence.But said Justice Sutherland at page 67:
The fact that the right involved is
of such a character that it cannot be
denied without violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutionsf. # . is obviously
one of those compelling considerations
which must prevail in determining
whether it is embraced within the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Sutherland goes on to state the requisites of due
process at page 68:
It never has been doubted by this Court
or any other so far as we know, that
notice and hearing are preliminary steps
essential to the passing of an enforceable
judgment, and that they, together with a
legally competent tribunal having jurisdiction of the case, constitute basic
elements of the constitutional requirement
of due process of law.
In 1835 Justice Story of the United States Supreme Court
sitting as Circuit Justice in the case of United States
v. Battiste, 24 Fed.Cas. 1042 (No. 14,545) rejected the
rule that jurors were free to disregard rulings and
instructions of the judge in reaching a verdict on the facts.
Justice Story said at page 1043:
I hold it the most sacred constitutional
right of every party accused of crime, that
the jury should respond as to the facts and
the court as to the law . . . Every person
accused as a criminal has a right to be tried
according to the law of the land, the fixed
law of the land; and not by the law as a jury
may understand it, or choose, from wantonness,
or ignorance, or accidental mistake, to
interpret it.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Are counsel for appellants prepared to assert that the lay
justices of this state, without essential legal training,
without access to the law books and materials available to
city court judges and district judges can provide a defendant
raising legal defenses an adequate and effective resolution
of his legal claims according to the fixed law of the land
and not the law as the justice of the peace nmay understand
it or choose from ignorance or accidental mistake to interpret it."
Of course the due process clause does not guarantee
against all possibility of error and even l^w trained judges,
like law trained lawyers are not beyond possibility of error.
But the constitutional guarantees of due process like the
procedures of law generally are designed to at least minimize
the likelihood of error.
The contention of your amicus in this case is simple.
The right to be heard includes the right to a reasonable
probability of being understood.

Our legal system contem-

plates that a defendant charged with a crime has a right to
be heard asserting defenses of law as well as fact.

He is

accorded the right to trial by jury to hear his factual
assertions, equally he is entitled to have his legal claims
resolved by a judge.

Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama

continues at page 68:
What then, does a hearing include? . . .
The right to be heard would be in many cases,
of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-7intelligent and education layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with cringe, he is incapable,
generally of determining for himself whether
the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar
with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without
a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue
or otherwise inadmissible.
Your amicus contends for a simple proposition if a non lawyer
is generally incapable of defending himself, he is also unlikely
to be capable of judging the legal claims of others.

The

proposition is so obvious it seems almost silly to urge it.
Judges must be trained and knowledgeable in the law.

Unless a

judge is trained and knowledgeable in the law, how can he be
expected to follow the arguments of counsel or evaluate competing
arguments urged by counsel on each side, on the holding of a
case, or the meaning of a statute less than clear on its face.
How can one not trained in the law be expected to recognize
when a question must be researched by the reading of cases,
or where the cases may be found, or when found, what they
stand for?

Legal ability is a necessary qualification for a

judge and legal ability is, learned only by legal education and
the practice of law.
Due process of law guaranteed to a defendant in a
criminal case by the State and Federal Constitutions includes
a right to ffa fair trial in a fair tribunal."

In re Murchison,

349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955).

This

is not a guarantee of a trial free from error or possibility
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of error but it certainly is a guarantee of a trial before
a judge who is reasonably qualified to recognize and prevent
or correct error.

In Frank v. Mangrum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S. Ct.

582, 59 L.Ed. 969 (1915), the Court, recognizing that not
all error violated due process, restated the requirement
of due process as fimdamental rights including "the right
to be heard according to the usual course of law in such
cases."

237 U.S. at 334-5.

Your amicus contends that the

right to be heard includes a reasonable chance of being
understood.

Due process would be violated by trial before

a judge who did not understand the language which the lawyers
spoke and in which the statutes and cases were written.

But

as any first year law student knows, law itself is a special
language, arduously mastered, which must be learned if lawyer
talk is to be understood and statutes and cases applied as
they are meant to be applied.

As Justice Larsen stated for

this Court in Christianson v. Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P.2d 314
(1945):
Many attempts have been made to further
define 'due process1 but they all resolve
into the thought that a party shall have
his day in court -- that is each party
shall have the right to a hearing before
a competent court, with the privilege of
being heard and introducing evidence to
establish his cause or defense. . .
In 1975, with the state of complexity of the law today, only
a judge "learned in the law" is capable of serving as a
"competent court" before whom a defendant may have the
opportunity of establishing his defense.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9~
In Murchison, supra, rhe Court nmnhasized that "[Ojur
systerr o'" "i .-- •• ;.•<-' always
proi:a.}'i-iicy M

nde-nvcr c. ,a nrevent even the

un fairness . "

''« ; ]T.:+

a

1"**.

[EJvery preceding \!>inh ''iiuUl oiicr a
possible temptation -o ! :n: average man
as a judge . . » nor to hold the balance
nice, clear, and true between the State
and the accused denies the latter due
process of laf- ,
Tumey v. Ohio, 112

a. .", a: d , i:', •

•'':". .at.''

,

J

,

;

While in V-m;^ and :'^Vn i- - • •, f'bo t ..>i;'L oca I : .:«.ii.

(]9''7).

jun..a;.a; . m t e m s t in the ease vdreb Might preclude impart. *•!
justice, Lis conclusions apolv as \T* i * ,
tbo •.'•-.•;•' • iNY.p.;;-! .• -.. applying > m

r-:_. •

• av: i,ov,vvri

: ^-a: n'.ij,
i L par " i al J y

he tries.
•,e.,1 :,•

In (V-Yiou v. • a

do :

JV ." i,

DisL ..'.•• , •/. flal.Trd 2 n . ' • !) Hal. rt n.
the (1 :"! L i\'f:i i a Supreme C:iri
"OSLICC

o

' !.

o

•

:r- , i<>,

n r a^-

. i * . u[ .. n ^nmny arc' Murehison

•'?•<•(•'.' :h.- ) '^cr-'re .

due {JI\ ci"-.:* ' '

. :

,

'>? , a'^ p , : 0 ), v!97^0 ,

)o\:\i Ca.liiornia v s

and conrit'i,;,);' (haa .'jat'^vcr justification
existed iii {he

Yu '< >! u c ai

for

j
4ayi.'f r

nidges

• > . ' * • . .

; i

- :.;OwCn. c**. dtl ions and \;aer.

measured by modern standards.
The Utah Consrirucn J /oa.--a;; : .-a ,1a
training and experience .or ] udaea .

• -'•,

.a

• j.j,.yi

i'ae utaisLi laa'aai ra: a aires

that every justice of i:he Supreme. C O U L L and eveiy uist,
judge be

n

an active

member of the lang, in good standing,

learned in the law."

An '

• ; .-.'i

o

LII*

Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § §

29J.

peace, the Cnnstitution does not mandate

that they
not;
be W.
learned
in J.Live
leaves the issue for
Digitized by
the Howard
Hunter Law Library,
Reuben la-..,
Clark Law out
School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10l e g i s i a L J \ro r p s o . l i : j-''i),
Cons ^ i ~
t 11;- i en ,
for j udi
peace

i J

as

lac.

:

of

aecn^gai inwhng t h e

.

: rane'l

Lhe

district:

suggested
* '< ; ;

»-r

.

j;afn;s

. .

: • \ •

' - li;;,;

roads

If

minor

eases

a-

pastices

thorp -•>
• - - -••

-'(0.0/,

longer

There

no-;

ape [v.

L\W J;.*.,' s t ' u o . ; i s

l c i \ \ > \ J-' 1 <*•-

<ii

judges

in

of

the

in t h e

1 aw :? n

the

a n d g i ft a ! a a ' a . ..
as

a competent

and e x p e r i e n c e
I.
effecr,
and

.•

:i'.

th^re

of

;.hp

:h

chn^

were

the

f

ho'di ,-f

"laws o f

both

'

• n;r;„

More s i g n i f i c a i l t l y ,
state

a t r a e o-aca .-•* i o i ; . ' 1

loga;

formal

Lu

servo

: r ; inning

] ax /,

'

snaiinnhle
iN"^

the ffeh

; a- -,a ;u*p" '• ^

LSoh c o n s i s t a d

dongress

. h.M-(. . r .

;

< (l i m /

!H% witl i t h e

b n a n d v<,!nrv5; o f

f • ha

are

t r, r e h/ on c i c y

in

no

modern

a . 1 ; v: ? nih i e i o n t : /

of

what

i hero

^ " J r \ w :i

,

fa

the^

when t h e U t a h Coi is M i n t . Lon w e n t

\C'r> b o n n e v o i u m e a

iroledirp1

.a; l si

taw a n a

lawyers,

. . ;;...
iaw

ho l a c k e d

taadvu

T

travo]

reasons,

wear r,n^;

^:" ; , >>:.[ .

practice

w * .hi

ie ^ c v e ' opr-ern. a.,

stare

fa

Crrrp < u d haws '~*r

(

and

• •..*•:

La t b .

^adje.. V

effectively

-ess

-cap ah"!

-a:

i ndge i f

oua

. .•

<' •

of

s.=a;

'a

the

u ] i ; i i. c l t y

^

•• • *:

ias>Lb1o

!'">7r>r

s of

-;

[..,(

serving

lu

Lhe e e n n m '

am!

was / n a i

state

acres,

w - n l a ! maize

when we c o m p a r e

of

ih^re
'

HLalv

i s no s h o r t a g e

">.a^e

transportation

aid r a ^ r a n o

port,

Utah
'earning

1 L t i g a n i s hat! "•

eepnbh:

W<
' a t irr.e when

:he

^ ..:-,, .

\ ho Cor, 1 ^ , aa r . :aa ^;:

in

Inadequate

o)

+

of

o f le(al.

".* .

t o where a l a w y e r was a v a i l a b l e ;
trac.ition

Cramers

importance

' • M ' . ^ ^ ^ i C ' • ;: -^ r . " | .

a s we I : -,.J f o r

Perhaps

hy . i c

nT two
ie

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Reports
The

c \ i ernes

the

-.dames or

into

territory

atah

Reports

and /-IS bound volumes of
July 197-')..

nited States Reports

f

AIJIU1:":-!'^!!

];v -'tan Cod

v*'i....f -..''•

(through

*^- msi

. mime of the I'cic^^

-si

dn i Keporl .. is .

published every fL-;/ v;eol;s as are the Federal S u p p l e m e n t s ,
the Federal l'e^rri"' ;?; a.r: *"• .\.;; iona.'«. roportt.-rs
or the regioa:- in the :sa( ;oi.
States Supreme CourtJ

..llL s..<m<

n

cr

a~ each

The opinions of the United

; no 1 ( '7V7<

'."' ' , m

,« i : ^(ui.njetuu last

• .*'- i' . ay m e m o r a n d u m

opinions) of volume vdd of tMe

fupsci.e :'mrt Jlopoiter.

Prpcech! ay fdw e.-'S'-s m, y , :i.-t\<j w'j is a i ^ ," - ; , <. ..<, . m:y of
t .-.

* •; i ' s i:i'c.i.Mi'ii,; . r; < h o "I 07^ tori-.
lu a speech deliverer

at I L S me.d::in°- ~:

'

m
'

i!.- -Mrrr [ can tar Association
'

•"•::'...•/ ay, . , reporting

on the state of id:. federal courts noted t \*n het:v;oer; 1953
sue

\c-''"> the n u m b e r of '!fu'!l signed opinion-d*

Sup: ".<> ^ *u.'. . <•

' • *•

•;.<*.• d '

..'••

'.•• more t iian u i ^ ; ^ ^ ; iy ', f.yi siyned

opinions j'n f J £v" : J'd y, !cF/°>).

Ourina the same l:vvir ; -'ear

period the r u b b e r of c'\r-( r d^r^a ,*d . .. a
ha*- i'•.•]'. from i ? f ; f> .;. i'•)':>>> -A; yi-' ^ In ~h'7'it '

(dried

Justice Rurger began his remarks \.'i_!h <: ceo: at ion f-jiii
Dean Roseoe I\--.,,u*

:

• |V

courts in the ddth ecnlcry c^*n I ci i.-u

" '-Re ,-: «.•. icin
;>

n carried -a v/I*_h

methods and procedures of the Jdth and 'Addi centuries.
'We ;irn i"n ? h *• *-" -- - " an o>a; • u'.> c. cm
legal doc''-m on:; .:ad n< a'1 ^ dovd.opiiui

UP;'1"!

materials,

ia-<\ As ce-, legal

B u r g e r , Report on the Federal J u d i c i a l branch, 93 Siip,
Ct. R e p . 3291 (1974).
Ibid,
at X'-1} .
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mater J. a Is proliferate the tasks o!: lawyering and judging
become increasingly ororo r.,
judge can rely \:oon

X^r onn-.-

!

\u-.od

the Io:iefs and arguments o r c.^i-isei and

his own training and experience
c . • , ".:• b

.00 ..".

•• .

in resolving new and diffi-

J uc winn. does a justice of the peace

without legal training, do when faced with a conflict between
counsel or vhou c-.i-ons..?! refers i.e.; a line of case precedents
sale to establish a proposition of law?
A class n misdemeanor, triable by i'tab Stal:uLes before
a law m r ' . n u

n^ty j LK!,- .>. • ,; •• . ..-.- ••v- i : Linou iustice of : re

peace may raise i ssues o!: statutory Intorpiretat i on , uhe
relevar.ee and signi f Lcanco of case preoodon; •- , _ .,-.

!

o ,

federalist! ana toe appiicaniiity u:' unit.: a ntnm-^ Say :"eire
Court decisions on federal Constitutional questions,
: :

]no roogai'g [ s rh.' y sacc i < o o

bar, b.t;.,\. 7!-.:-ol-2!3 „

. w

;

•

'-tali •

a !v " : t ed

to

As reenacted in Wo;a? l;:-.- statute

e 1 iminate 11 a previo 1 is exceptior. oermi11iru.- ncr-1 awyers to
serve a* noario- ssLecneys,

Yet we SI. I .: :. permit persons*

not qualified to be lawyers to serve as justices of the
peace.

Perhaps the pra.ct\\

•

^ .•

bv a view that minor crimes iaecssari f y
legal i ssues.

*: •

et~-ud d

o o o l v e oely stmoie

That view "i s ;,.i Longer si rpportable in fact.

The Supreme Cjiua. spol e * ..

••

o i nt: I n Arger singer v.

Ham Lin . qH? n. a „ ;• " , ;';•, vi';"/;a:
We are by .no means convinced [not Legal
and constitutional questions involved
in a case that actually leads io imprisonment even for a brief period are any loss
complex than when a person can be S O I L
off for six. months or i-i.ro .
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the

-13Argersinger holds that duo process requires appointment
of counsel for an indigent defendant, absent knowing and
intelligent waiver, whenever the defendant faces the
possibility of a sentence to imprisonment.

The Court's

holding compels a parallel conclusion, that due process .
requires trial before a law trained judge in similar cases,
since without a judge competent to rule on the legal issues
in his case, the defendant's right to counsel will be
rendered ineffective in any case which involves substantial
issues of law.,

POINT II
THE INCOMPETENCE OF THE NON LAW TRAINED JUSTICE
OF THE PEACE IS AGGRAVATED BY THE STATE'S FAILURE
TO PROVIDE SUCH JUSTICES WITH ACCURATE RESOURCES
AND ASSISTANCE IN RENDERING LEGAL DECISIONS.
At the time of the district court's decision below,
the means provided by the state to shield the justices from
legal error resulting from their lack of learning in the law
was a Manual for Justices of the Peace in the State of Utah
prepared by Brigitte M. Bodenheimer in 1956. While the
manual is written in a lucid and simple style, it is today
hopelessly outdated and affirmatively misleading, as a few
examples will show.

The non law trained judge faced with

a question of law and no means or ability to resolve it is
likely to rely heavily on the representations of the County
Attorney.

The manual expressly approves this practice.
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-14On page 14 the following advice appears:
There will no clribt be many occasions, ^ ••
however, when the answer to 1lis problem
cannot be found in this book. In such
case it is recommended that the justice
get in touch with the county attorney of
his county who is the legal advisor of
the county's precinct officers.
Again at: page 59:
The defendant is often not represented
by counsel in a justice court. County .'
attorneys are accustomed to that fact
and are generally able to play the role
of both prosecutor and defense attorney
with fairness to both sides.
(Emphasis
added).
Given such, advice in his manual it shoe e ho no suv*:u*'se
if -t justice of the peace resists appointing a second
defense attorney

(h : r iu n\C''

an indigent defendant.

•

At prj,e

'

tue prosecutor)

or

]

> "«,h'i(,,.e on instructing

Sometimes after the justice has finished
his instructions to the jury, one or both
. attorneys may ask him to add further charges
to the jury, which the attorney reads to him.
The justice then says:
'I so charge 1 or
1
1
1 refuse to so charge.
If he is in doubt
on how to rule, the county attorney, if
present, will generally come to his aid..
(Emphasis added)
The effect of this advice i i t tl le offi cial 'Manual is to
invite? • h<- "neutral" \uh e to defer, when out r.f his legal
doner:,

L-

* < ' 'unislnn ef one o r "h- litigant1?: counsel..

The right: • <- decision by an Lr.^a: u ^
in fact whenever th- untrained

u .:

]

is denied

iud)\e r; en lien enon to decide

a question O L law uiluouu the In m-U d;,r , .- irainhig to decide
1 1: :

i n that situation he is officially advised to rely upon

the prosecutor I

Defendant's r/;_jit \ c he heard in his own
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-15defense in effect becomes his right to be heard by opposing
counsel!
A cautionary statement on the role of the county
attorney does appear in the manual, in chapter 11 on
Preliminary Hearings, page 89:
The Justice will often seek the guidance
of the county attorney: he must not
forget however that the county attorney
is obligated to represent one side in the
proceedings and to prosecute the defendant
with all legitimate means at his disposal
while it is the duty of the magistrate
to stay above the parties as an impartial
judge.
This advice, however, in addition to being inconsistent
with that quoted above, comes in the chapter related to
preliminary hearings of felony cases and indictible misdemeanors.

It does not appear in the chapters relating to

criminal trials.

In Salt Lake County, where preliminary

hearings are held in Salt Lake City Court rather than before
a justice of the peace, the justice will have little or no
immediate occasion to read chapter 11.
In September 1975, a new Manual for Justices of the
Peace was issued, published by the State Court Administrator.
This Manual is a considerable improvement over the one in
use at the time of the judgment below but it does not solve
the problem.

The new Manual itself states in a preface by

Richard B. Peay, State Court Administrator, dated August 25,
1975:
One word of caution should be noted.
This manual is not intended to take
the place of a compilation of Utah laws.
It refers to the Utah Code in almost
every paragraph and is designed to be
used
inW. Hunter
conjunction
with
the
Code.
The
Digitized by
the Howard
Law Library, J. Reuben
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School,
BYU.
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-16Code is as Indispensable L«> : he justice
of the peace as it: is; to any other judj-ie
in the State. It s realized that more
than half of the justices do not have
ready access to a complete and up-to-date
Utah Code. " ~ fKmuhasis added)
Thus av have tin": ne\; manual replacing an outmoded and easoLete
~.a*uai

Vsi^aja , > r-- luu-ui in con j unetiur. vith the lh_.ih d(..:o

>;iut::i is i;ot avalleeLe in Its entire tv < e : ••:'< ' a: .' •
the

iJS-ices of the peace la the Stale,

\.'(H'C! -A,.!, , . •• e/, i acv'i1,

iie'r c\rcv\

:' •> f

i: CoCes

,11 s u r a l ! auf v:eu laai aP. ai ned

lav: JiararLes to supplement t he rev innual

Lor justices u: ih.e

r'eace, Lnac wuulu nut an sufficient

for on-'1 could uo ,.;ore

exnect: a person not tr.tia" • a . he

. a,j

.' ' a, i 1 *

'a

j

sorely because r,uuy,'li':d T..TiLh I a v. Looks than eaaj eoii. u cxroct
a

':\;a-r "a

a»ua . • u effectively as a surgeon \;iien supplied

w i t h medi a a 1 I n s i aa i: a • n t s .

POINT

•;

i

A REQUIREMENT THAT JUSTICES OF THE PEACE BE TRAINED
IN THE LAW IS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER PROVISIONS OF
UTAH LAW REQUIRING SPECIAL TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE
IN THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSIONS AFFECTING OTHER
PEOPLE'S LIVES.
Tna J ,v s o-*: the S,/-'- r' d-,-• •
to tin.' 'Mr f'roi-, practicing

law.

Utah laws uri'i'hlc requirements ci

• -hi!-:

..->,- no, admitted

• ..•. >',; /',-5i--:,.

:-x; .airly,

education, train In;-: or

experience for a number of other professions: n!v--:; ; . !.a;c
U.C.A.

S jM-12-2 ; dentists U.C.A.

!) 58-/-2; paimoors U.C.A.

§ 58-1';-' • 'otorinarinns U.C.A. fi 58-28-2; public school
teachers U.C.A. § 53-2-15, 16, 21; pharmacists U.C.A. § 58-17-2;
professional engineers U.C.A. § 58-22-12; practicing psychologists
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-17While special exceptions are made in some of these provisions
in general, they reflect a requirement of professional education
before one can practice a profession on other people (or in the
case of veterinarians, animals).

This, in turn, reflects a

sensible judgment, that in our modern world with public
education generally available to those who seek it, education
for a profession can legitimately be made a pre-condition to
the practice of such professions.
in Gibb v. Dorius,

U.

Recently indeed,this court

, 533 P.2d 299, (1975) held that

the withdrawing of blood from the human body for the purpose
of determining the alcoholic or drug content of the blood
was the practice of medicine and had to be done by or under
the supervision and direction of a physician.
ruled interpreting U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10.

The court so

It would seem anomalous

that in the enforcement of the laws against drinking and driving
a sample of blood cannot be removed from the human body except
by one acting in accordance with standard medical practice
but in the enforcement of those very same laws, a person can
lose his liberty for up to six months upon the judgment of a
judge with no training or learning in the law.
Of course, there are justices of the peace without legal
training whose natural intelligence or talents for law may
compensate for lack of formal legal education or other legal
training.

Such persons no doubt exist just as there are persons

whose natural gifts as teacher or healer might make them effective
public school teachers or physicians despite the lack of professional education.

But the possible existence of such persons

would hardly justify compelling one to attend school taught by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-18a teacher without formal training or compelling one to submit
to an operation by an enthusiastic and possibly gifted amateur.
Yet the person charged with Lhe crime before a nonlawyer justice
is compelled to submit to the professional ministrations of one
without professional training.

We submit that the court below

was correct in ruling that one facing loss of liberty in such a
hearing was denied due process of law.

Indeed, the Code of

Judicial Conduct approved and adopted by the Justices of this
Court on March 1, 1974, specifically provides in Canon 3:
A judge should be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence in it.
Can a justice of the peace without legal training be expected
to be faithful to the law, to maintain a professional competence
he never initially obtained?

Or, are justices of the peace

exempted from the Code of Judicial Conduct applicable to other
judges.

The ruling of the court below, we urge, is a ruling

that one faced with the possibility of loss of liberty is
entitled to trial before a judge subject to Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and for whom that Canon has meaning
in that he could reasonably be expected to meet it.
POINT IV
'AFFIRMANCE OF THE DECISION BELOW WILL IMPOSE NO
UNDUE BURDEN ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
IN THIS STATE BY REASON OF RECENT LEGISLATION
ALREADY IN EFFECT.
A court adjudicating a claim of constitutional right is
often faced with the unfortunate prospect that recognition of
the right asserted can only be achieved at the cost of considerable inconvenience or difficulty to other substantial
interests.
present
case
theBYU.
Court can affirm
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-19the decision below without burdening the administration of
justice in the State.

By reason of a statute enacted by the

Legislature which took effect on July 2, 1975, the right
recognized by the Court below is now also accorded by statute.
The statute, U.C.A. Special 1975 Supplement § 78-5-4 provides:
(b) (1) Notwithstanding any provision of
this code relating to jurisdiction or venue
of justice courts, every defendant shall be
accorded the right to be tried and sentenced
by a judge who is a member of the Utah state
bar in any matter wherein the judge may have:
the option of imposing a jail sentence. If,
upon being advised of this right at the time
of arraignment, the defendant waives this
right, the judge may then proceed to hear
the matter and, where warranted, may impose
a jail sentence. Unless such a waiver is
executed by the defendant, the case shall be
forthwith transferred to the nearest or most
convenient court in that county, which is
presided over by a judge who is a member of
the Utah state bar.
The statute would seem to reflect a judgment of the Utah
Legislature consistent with the position of the court below,
that a defendant facing trial before a justice of the peace
who may impose a jail sentence, has a right, unless waived,
to trial before a law-trained judge.

Of course, the decision

below may have been a factor in the enactment of the legislation.
But it is significant that the legislation was enacted so promptly
following the decision below and before appellate review of that
decision.

Appellants urge in their briefs against the decision

below that there are several counties in the state where there
are no practicing lawyers.

This point hardly seems significant

in view of the statute which in any event requires trial before
a law-trained judge unless waived where defendant faces a
possibility of imprisonment.

The statute applies throughout

the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
the stateDigitized
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-20the Legislature determined there were no insuperable burdens
to providing trial before a law-trained judge in the situations
covered by the statute.

There is nothing to indicate the

legislative judgment has proven faulty nor in any event will
the decision in this case affect procedures in counties without
lawyers while the statute remains in effect.
Appellants1 contention concerning the absence of lawyers
in several counties in the state actually argues against their
position.

It was bad enough facing trial before a judge without

legal training anywhere in the state, but it must have been even
worse in counties where neither the defendant nor, indeed, the
justice of the peace himself had ready access to legal consultation.

The county without lawyers is likely as well to be a

county without law books other than, of course, the outmoded
1956 version of the Manual for Justices of the Peace.

The

appellants1 contention seems to be in a county without lawyers
it is better to proceed in whatever fashion necessary to dispose
of cases rather than to arrange to bring two or possibly three
lawyers in to hear such cases.

A defense attorney, a county

attorney, and a law-trained judge•

Your amicus contends that

to a legal system concerned with justice as well as convenience,
the appropriate judgment is that made by the Legislature in the
new statute.

A defendant facing possibility of imprisonment

has the right to trial before a law-trained judge unless he
waives that right.
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-21POINT V •
THE DECISION BELOW IS CONSISTENT WITH UTAH STATUTE
AND AUTHORITATIVE COMMENTARY ON THE LAW. IT IS ALSO
CONSISTENT WITH RECENT JUDICIAL OPINIONS IN OTHER STATES.
The Utah Judicial Code, pursuant to the recently enacted
statute, U.C.A. Special 1975 Supplement § .78-5-4, recognizes
that:
Every defendant shall be accorded the right
to be tried and sentenced by a judge who is
a member of the Utah state bar in any matter
wherein the judge may have the option of
imposing a jail sentence.
This is the very right, recognized by the court below, that
amicus is contending for!

Ignoring the statutory right,

appellants argue that there is a presumption of constitutionality
to the denial of such a right based upon the presumption of
constitutionality of legislative judgments.

It is difficult

to see how a presumption of constitutionality can be applied
to what is no longer the law, especially when the law was
changed to recognize the very right recognized by the court
below.

If the issue raised on this appeal has not been mooted

by the new statute, the statute still has some bearing -- if
nothing else --in

terms of the legislative judgment of

whether there is a right to trial before a judge who is a
member of the bar in cases where a jail term may be imposed.
The new statute is consistent with a long history of
criticism of the justices of the peace not trained in the law.
Forty-nine years ago, Chester H. Smith wrote in his article,
The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 Cal.
L.Rev. 118, (1926), cited on page 9 of one of the briefs of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-22-

appellants,

that:

While the j u s t i c e of the peace system has
a long h i s t o r y and has been firmly embedded
in the fundamental law of the s t a t e s , yet i t
i s an anachronism in our j u r i s p r u d e n c e the
p e r p e t u a t i o n of which cannot be j u s t i f i e d ,
15 Cal. L. Rev. at xT. 140 (Emphasis added).
Smith concludes h i s a r t i c l e with the following recommendation
at p . 141:
If our states are to realize the ideal of
Magna Charta . . . there must be state
wide abolition of tHe office of justice
of the peace. This can be accomplished
. . . . most affectively by constitutional
enactment. (Emphasis added).
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey wrote in a book published for the National Conference
of Judicial Councils in 1949, Minimum Standards of Judicial
Administration, at p. 306 that:
The recommendation that the present justice
of the peace system should either be eliminated
or greatly improved epitomizes all recommendations of every study made of that system.
Your amicus does not urge the abolition of the justice of the
peace system, but its improvement, by affirmance of the decision
below, limiting the power of justices of the peace in criminal
cases, a limitation now recognized in Utah by statute.

This

limitation is consistent with the standards declared by the
American Bar Association.

In the American Bar Association

Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating
to the Function of the Trial Judge, (1972), it is provided
in Standard 1.2:
The t r i a l judge should be familiar with
and adhere to the canons and codes a p p l i c a b l e
to the j u d i c i a r y , the code of p r o f e s s i o n a l
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y applicable to the l e g a l p r o fession, and standards concerning the proper
a
m i nbyi sthet rHoward
a t i oW.nHunter
of Lawcriminal
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i cSchool,
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-23The American Bar Association1s Project on Standards for Court
Organization (1974) recommends in Section 1.21(a) that all
persons selected as judges:
. . . should have a broad general and
legal education and should have been
admitted to the bar.
The decision of the Supreme Court of California in Gordon v.
Justice Court for the Yuba Judicial District, supra, has been
discussed above in Point I.

That the California decision is

not an isolated phenomenon is shown by a very recent decision
of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Perry v. Banks, 521 S.W.2d
549 (1975). The case involved an appeal from a ruling of the
Chancery Court, enjoining two nonlawyer candidates for county
judge from being issued a certificate of election, in the event
either should be the apparent election winner,on the ground
that,as nonlawyers,they were not eligible to hold the office
of county judge.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee

ruled that the case was rendered moot because neither of the
nonlawyer candidates was elected; instead a third candidate,
a qualified lawyer was elected.

Two of the five Justices of

the Tennessee Supreme Court dissented from the ruling that
the issue was moot.

In an opinion by Justice Henry the two

dissenters presented their view on the merits of the appeal.
They were prepared,to rule that a county judge did not, under
Tennessee law have

to be a lawyer but could not constitutionally

preside in cases wherein a citizen could be deprived of his
liberty.

They said at page 555:

We further hold that for a non-attorney
judge to preside over any criminal trial,
. . . or any other proceeding wherein a
citizen
may
be Law
deprived
ofClark
his
liberty,
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-24is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States
and Article 1, Sec, 8 of the Constitution
of Tennessee.
The advancing standards of due process
compel this conclusion.
The provision of the Constitution of Tennessee cited by Justice
Henry,Article 1, Section 8 provides in the very words of Magna
Carta:
That no man shall be taken or imprisoned. . .
or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his
life, liberty or property but by the judgment
of his peers or the law of the land.
While the opinion of two of the five Justices of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee does not, of course, establish the law of
that state, it may be regarded as a significant indication
of Tennessee law, particularly where the other justices do
not speak to the issue because they find it moot.

Certainly

the opinions in Perry v. Banks, supra, call into question the
authority of Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772 (Tenn. Ct. of App.
1972) cited in appellants1 briefs.

It should be noted that

Ditty v. Hampton was a decision of the Tennessee Court of
Appeals, an intermediate court, and its decision cannot be
considered authoritative in light of the opinions of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee in Perry v. Banks, supra.
A final comment on and quotation from Justice Henry's
opinion in Perry v. Banks, supra, seems appropriate.

In

Justice Henry's view "the advancing standards of due process
compel the conclusion11 that, unless he is a lawyer, a county
judge
. . . may not preside over . . . any . . .
proceeding wherein a citizen may be deprived
of his
liberty.
521
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-25Th is is the position urged ir this case by amicus curiae.
It is also what is now required, unless waived by defendant,
by the new Utah statute.

We urge this Court to recognize

no lesser standard for the State of Utah.
CONCLUSION
Amicus curiae respectfully urges the Court to affirm the
decision of the district court in this case.
Respectfully submitted,

LIONEL FRANKEL
1863 Hubbard Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Utah Civil Liberties Union
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